


# NETWORKERS 2003

THE POWER TO TRANSFORM BUSINESS. **now.**



Cisco.com

## Deploying 802.1x for LAN Security

Session SEC-2005

SEC-2005  
8136\_05\_2003\_c1

©2003, Cisco Systems, Inc. All rights reserved.

2

## Overview and Agenda

Cisco.com

- **Looking at the Concepts of Authentication**
- **Applying Them to Network Access Control**
- **Understanding the Protocols and Mechanisms behind 802.1x**
- **Understanding Various Authentication Methods**
- **Understanding PKI Certs in the Context of 802.1x Authentication**
- **Understanding Authorization and Policy Enforcement with 802.1x**

SEC-2005  
8136\_05\_2003\_c1

©2003, Cisco Systems, Inc. All rights reserved.

3

## What We Won't Be Covering

Cisco.com

- **AAA authentication on routers**
- **IPSec authentication**

SEC-2005  
8136\_05\_2003\_c1

©2003, Cisco Systems, Inc. All rights reserved.

4

## Threat Model Overview

## Risk Assessment— Potential Cost of External Threats

In the 2002 CSI/FBI survey:

- Over **90%** of over 400 participants reported security breaches
- **223** reported security incidents totaled losses over **\$455 million**
- Source: CSI/FBI 2002 Computer Crime and Security Survey
- Providing Authentication and access control on network ports can significantly reduce the potential attacker community


**“Keep the Outsiders Out”**

## Easy Unauthorized Access

Cisco.com

- User connects to network
- Requests an IP address
- Gets one via DHCP
- Gets access to network resources

Nice and Flexible; Great for Mobility



SEC-2005  
8136\_05\_2003\_c1

©2003, Cisco Systems, Inc. All rights reserved.

7

## Risk Assessment— Potential Cost of Internal Threats

Cisco.com

In the 2002 CSI/FBI survey:

- Highest source of loss was theft of proprietary information—over **\$170 million** alone
- Of the top causes of loss, **insider misuse of resources was in top 5**
- **Insider attack by disgruntled employees** was listed as likely source by **75%** of respondents
- Source: CSI/FBI 2002 Computer Crime and Security Survey
- **Providing policy enforcement, compartmentalization, and usage monitoring can further reduce that number**

**“Keep the Insiders Honest”**

SEC-2005  
8136\_05\_2003\_c1


©2003, Cisco Systems, Inc. All rights reserved.

8

# Unauthorized Use of the Network

Cisco.com

Authorized User/Employee



Authorized User/Employee

SEC-2005  
8136\_05\_2003\_c1

©2003, Cisco Systems, Inc. All rights reserved.

9

# Understanding Authentication

Cisco.com

SEC-2005  
8136\_05\_2003\_c1


©2003, Cisco Systems, Inc. All rights reserved.

10

## What Is Authentication?

Cisco.com

- The process of establishing and confirming the identity of a client requesting services
- Authentication is only useful if used to establish corresponding authorization
- Model is very common in everyday scenarios



SEC-2005  
8136\_05\_2003\_c1

©2003, Cisco Systems, Inc. All rights reserved.

11

## Some Important Points on Authentication

Cisco.com

- The process of authentication is used to verify a claimed identity
- An identity is only useful as a pointer to an applicable policy and for accounting
- Without authorization or associated policies, authentication alone is pretty meaningless
- An authentication system is only as strong as the method of verification used

SEC-2005  
8136\_05\_2003\_c1

©2003, Cisco Systems, Inc. All rights reserved.

12

## What's This Authorization Thing?

Cisco.com

- **The concept of being able to differentiate services amongst groups or individuals**
- **If everyone had the same rights, then we wouldn't need authorization**

SEC-2005  
8136\_05\_2003\_c1

©2003, Cisco Systems, Inc. All rights reserved.

13

## Why Do We Care?

Cisco.com

- **Because differentiation of services and rights control is critical in network environments**
- **Not everyone has the same privileges; not all resources or information have the same level of confidentiality**
- **Unauthorized access, theft, and misuse of computer resources accounted for over \$2 billion in losses in 2001**

SEC-2005  
8136\_05\_2003\_c1

©2003, Cisco Systems, Inc. All rights reserved.

14


# An Operational Overview of Network Authentication

## Port-Based Network Authentication

- **Have the client (a user or a device) request a service—in this case access to the network**
- **Verify the client's claim of identity—authentication**
- **Reference the configured policies for the requesting client**
- **Grant or deny the services as per the policy—authorization**

# Applying the Authentication Model to the Network

Cisco.com




SEC-2005  
8136\_05\_2003\_c1

©2003, Cisco Systems, Inc. All rights reserved.

17

# Device Authentication and 802.1x

Cisco.com




SEC-2005  
8136\_05\_2003\_c1

©2003, Cisco Systems, Inc. All rights reserved.

18

# Wired Access Control Model

Cisco.com



Client and Switch Talk 802.1x    Switch Speaks to Auth Server Using RADIUS

Actual Authentication Conversation Is between Client and Auth Server Using EAP;  
the Switch Is Just a Middleman, but Is Aware of What's Going on


SEC-2005  
8136\_05\_2003\_c1

©2003, Cisco Systems, Inc. All rights reserved.

19

# A Closer Look...

Cisco.com




SEC-2005  
8136\_05\_2003\_c1

©2003, Cisco Systems, Inc. All rights reserved.

20

# Wireless Access Control Model

Cisco.com



SEC-2005  
8136\_05\_2003\_c1

©2003, Cisco Systems, Inc. All rights reserved.

21

# Protocols and Mechanisms

Cisco.com

SEC-2005  
8136\_05\_2003\_c1

©2003, Cisco Systems, Inc. All rights reserved.

22

## IEEE 802.1x?

Cisco.com

- Standard set by the IEEE 802.1 working group—ratified in December of 2001
- Designed to address and provide **port-based access control** using authentication
- Describes a standard **link layer protocol** used for **transporting higher-level authentication protocols (i.e. EAP)**
- **Actual enforcement is via MAC-based filtering and port state monitoring**

SEC-2005  
8136\_05\_2003\_c1

©2003, Cisco Systems, Inc. All rights reserved.

23

## Some IEEE Terminology

Cisco.com

IEEE Terms	Normal People Terms
Supplicant	Client
Authenticator	Network Access Device
Authentication Server	AAA/RADIUS Server

SEC-2005  
8136\_05\_2003\_c1

©2003, Cisco Systems, Inc. All rights reserved.

24

## What Does It Do?

Cisco.com

- Transport authentication information in the form of Extensible Authentication Protocol (EAP) payloads
- The authenticator (switch) becomes the middleman for relaying EAP received in 802.1x packets to an authentication server by using RADIUS to carry the EAP information
- Three forms of EAP are specified in the standard
  - EAP-MD5—MD5 Hashed Username/Password
  - EAP-OTP—One-Time Passwords
  - EAP-TLS—Strong PKI Authenticated Transport Layer Security (SSL)

Ethernet Header

802.1x Header

EAP Payload

SEC-2005  
8136\_05\_2003\_c1

©2003, Cisco Systems, Inc. All rights reserved.

25

## What Is EAP?

Cisco.com

- EAP—The Extensible Authentication Protocol
- A flexible protocol used to carry arbitrary authentication information
- Typically rides on top of another protocol such as 802.1x or RADIUS (could be TACACS+, etc.)
- Specified in RFC 2284


SEC-2005  
8136\_05\_2003\_c1

©2003, Cisco Systems, Inc. All rights reserved.

26

# Extensible Authentication Protocol (EAP)

Cisco.com



- Initially developed for PPP Authentication
- Code is *Request, Response, Success, or Failure*
- Identifier is used to match responses with requests
- Format of the data field is determined by the code field


SEC-2005  
8136\_05\_2003\_c1

©2003, Cisco Systems, Inc. All rights reserved.

27

# EAPOL (EAP over 802.1x) Frame Format

Cisco.com



SEC-2005  
8136\_05\_2003\_c1

©2003, Cisco Systems, Inc. All rights reserved.

28

## Different EAPOL Frame Types

Cisco.com

- **EAPOL-Start**
- **EAPOL-Logoff**
- **EAP-Packet**
- **EAPOL-Key**
- **EAPOL-Encapsulated-ASF-Alert**

SEC-2005  
8136\_05\_2003\_c1

©2003, Cisco Systems, Inc. All rights reserved.

29

## Current Prevalent Authentication Methods

Cisco.com

- **EAP-MD5: Uses MD5-based Challenge-Response for authentication**
- **EAP-TLS: Uses x.509 v3 PKI certificates and the TLS mechanism for authentication**
- **EAP-MSCHAPv2: Uses username/password MSCHAPv2 Challenge Response authentication**
- **LEAP: Uses username/password authentication**
- **PEAP: Protected EAP tunnel mode EAP encapsulator; tunnels other EAP types in an encrypted tunnel—much like web-based SSL**
- **EAP-TTLS: Other EAP methods over an extended EAP-TLS encrypted tunnel**
- **EAP-GTC: Generic token and OTP authentication**

SEC-2005  
8136\_05\_2003\_c1

©2003, Cisco Systems, Inc. All rights reserved.

30


# Understanding EAP-MD5

## EAP-MD5 Challenge Response System

- Password is never transmitted
- Client identity is transmitted in clear
- Random is generated on AAA server and sent as a challenge
- Client MD5 hashes the challenge using their password as the key
- AAA server receives response from client; compares MD5 hash result to that using stored password as key
- If they match, client used the right password

## EAP-MD5

Cisco.com



SEC-2005  
8136\_05\_2003\_c1

©2003, Cisco Systems, Inc. All rights reserved.

33

## EAP-MD5 Pros and Cons

Cisco.com

### Pros

- Well supported—mandatory in all EAP implementations
- Simple username/password scheme
- Lightweight on processing

### Cons

- In theory, security weaknesses—requires the storage of plaintext or reversible passwords on the AAA server
- Single factor auth only
- Being phased out by MSFT

SEC-2005  
8136\_05\_2003\_c1

©2003, Cisco Systems, Inc. All rights reserved.

34

# Understanding EAP-TLS

## EAP-TLS Authentication

- **Password's aren't used at all**
- **Instead TLS public key cryptography-based RSA handshake is used**
- **AAA Server authenticates client, but client can also authenticate AAA Server—mutual authentication**
- **AAA server receives cert from client, verifies authenticity of cert (using CA public key), then verifies bearer identity using TLS handshake**

## EAP-TLS and PKI Certificates

Cisco.com

- **EAP-TLS is the EAP implementation of the Transport Layer Security Protocol (similar to SSL)**
- **TLS uses public key certificates to authenticate clients**
- **Certificates must be x.509 v3 PKI certificates to be usable**

SEC-2005  
8136\_05\_2003\_c1

©2003, Cisco Systems, Inc. All rights reserved.

37

## Certificate Authorities

Cisco.com

- **A CA can be sourced by an enterprise internal or external trusted structure**
- **It just needs to be trusted by the users**
- **The responsibility of the CA is to verify the identity of the certificate holder PRIOR to handing out a certificate for them**
- **Internal structures can be set up using commercial products:**
  - VeriSign
  - Entrust
  - Microsoft CA
- **External CAs are services:**
  - VeriSign
  - GTE
  - Thawte


SEC-2005  
8136\_05\_2003\_c1

©2003, Cisco Systems, Inc. All rights reserved.

38

## The TLS Authentication Model (RSA-Based)

Cisco.com



## How Fred Authenticates Mary

Cisco.com

- **How does Fred Authenticate Mary?**

Mary's cert is signed by the ABC Inc. CA's private key. Fred should already have a copy of ABC Inc. CA's public key. He can use that to verify the validity of the cert by performing a digital signature check with the CA's public key.

- **But how does Fred know that the entity that presented the cert is really Mary, and not someone with a copy of Mary's cert?**

At the end of Mary's reply, Mary includes an MD5 hash of her cert and some other information unique to this communication session, that is signed with her private key. Fred uses the public key contained in the cert to verify the signature by the private key. If this works, he can now believe that the presenter of the cert with whom he is speaking to is also the bearer of the correct private key, meaning, by inference that the other person is indeed Mary.

SEC-2005  
8136\_05\_2003\_c1

©2003, Cisco Systems, Inc. All rights reserved.

40

## How Mary Authenticates Fred

Cisco.com

- **How does Mary authenticate Fred?**

**Exactly the same way Fred authenticated Mary, except the opposite; Mary also uses the CA's public key to verify the authenticity of the cert, but she will use Fred's public key to validate his signature**

SEC-2005  
8136\_05\_2003\_c1

©2003, Cisco Systems, Inc. All rights reserved.

41

## Common Questions

Cisco.com

- **Is key distribution needed?**

**No, there is no need for a key distribution scheme; all that is needed is for Fred and Mary to each have a copy of the CA's public key cert, and to trust that CA. Fred doesn't have to have previous knowledge of Mary's public key or vice-versa.**

- **Aside from issuing the certs, is there any other CA interaction required?**

**No, the CA only exists to issue the certs to the parties using TLS to authenticate. It is not actively needed in the authentication process. In some schemes it may also be used to periodically provide updates on revoked certs.**


SEC-2005  
8136\_05\_2003\_c1

©2003, Cisco Systems, Inc. All rights reserved.

42

# EAP-TLS

Cisco.com



SEC-2005  
8136\_05\_2003\_c1

©2003, Cisco Systems, Inc. All rights reserved.

43

# EAP-TLS Pros and Cons

Cisco.com

## Pros

- One of the strongest forms of authentication in existence
- Can be made a two factor system; sometimes more

## Cons

- Can be more complex to deploy—needs PKI
- Computationally intensive

SEC-2005  
8136\_05\_2003\_c1

©2003, Cisco Systems, Inc. All rights reserved.

44


# Understanding PEAP

## PEAP Authentication

- **PEAP doesn't do client authentication on its own**
- **PEAP tunnels other EAP methods within an encrypted tunnel—you still need to choose an EAP method to use within it**
- **PEAP uses the same TLS mechanism as EAP-TLS, but adds the record protocol for encryption**
- **The encrypted tunnel only exists for the duration of the authentication interaction, not all traffic**

# Conceptual Overview of PEAP

Cisco.com




SEC-2005  
8136\_05\_2003\_c1

©2003, Cisco Systems, Inc. All rights reserved.

47

# PEAP Setup

Cisco.com



SEC-2005  
8136\_05\_2003\_c1

©2003, Cisco Systems, Inc. All rights reserved.

48

## RADIUS in 802.1x

## How Is RADIUS Used Here?

- **RADIUS acts as the transport for EAP, from the authenticator (switch) to the authentication server (RADIUS server)**




- **RADIUS is also used to carry policy instructions back to the authenticator in the form of AV pairs**



# Understanding Microsoft Environments

## Windows Boot Cycle Overview



## Microsoft and Machine Authentication

Cisco.com

- **What is Machine Authentication?**

The ability of a Windows workstation to authenticate under its own identity, independent of the requirement for an interactive user session

- **What is it used for?**

Machine authentication is used at boot time by Windows OSes to authenticate and communicate with Windows Domain Controllers in order to pull down machine group policies

- **Why do we care?**

Pre-802.1x this worked under the assumption that network connectivity was a given; post-802.1x the blocking of network access prior to 802.1x authentication breaks the machine-based group policy model—UNLESS the machine can authenticate using its own identity in 802.1x

SEC-2005  
8136\_05\_2003\_c1

©2003, Cisco Systems, Inc. All rights reserved.

53

## Windows Machine Authentication

Cisco.com




SEC-2005  
8136\_05\_2003\_c1

©2003, Cisco Systems, Inc. All rights reserved.

54

## Machine Authentication and 802.1x

Cisco.com



SEC-2005  
8136\_05\_2003\_c1

©2003, Cisco Systems, Inc. All rights reserved.

55

## Machine Authentication EAP Methods

Cisco.com

- Follows method chosen for user authentication
- For EAP-TLS—will use machine certs
- For EAP-MD5 or EAP-MSCHAPv2—will use machine account and password

SEC-2005  
8136\_05\_2003\_c1

©2003, Cisco Systems, Inc. All rights reserved.

56

## Different Modes of Authentication in Microsoft Environments

Cisco.com

- **Controlled by registry keys**
- **Authentication by machine only**  
No need for user authentication if machine authentication is successful
- **Authentication by user only**  
No machine authentication taking place at all—be careful, this breaks group and system policies
- **Authentication by user and machine**  
Uses authentication of both user and machine; switches contexts when going from one to the other

SEC-2005  
8136\_05\_2003\_c1

©2003, Cisco Systems, Inc. All rights reserved.

57

## Microsoft Issues with DHCP

Cisco.com

- **DHCP is a parallel event, independent of 802.1x authentication**
- **With wired interfaces a successful 802.1x authentication DOES NOT force an DHCP address discovery (no media-connect signal)**
- **This produces a problem if not properly planned**
- **DHCP starts once interface comes up**
- **If 802.1x authentication takes too long, DHCP may time out...**


SEC-2005  
8136\_05\_2003\_c1

©2003, Cisco Systems, Inc. All rights reserved.

58

## DHCP Timeout Problem

Cisco.com



SEC-2005  
8136\_05\_2003\_c1

©2003, Cisco Systems, Inc. All rights reserved.

59

## How to Address DHCP Timeout with 802.1x?

Cisco.com

- **Use machine authentication—this allows the initial machine authentication to obtain an IP address**
- **Force an IP address renewal—using a script, using a service, disconnect/reconnect interface**
- **Don't plug in Ethernet interface until you are ready to log in**

SEC-2005  
8136\_05\_2003\_c1

©2003, Cisco Systems, Inc. All rights reserved.

60



Cisco.com

# Identity-Based Policy Enforcement

SEC-2005  
8136\_05\_2003\_c1

©2003, Cisco Systems, Inc. All rights reserved.

61

## Authorization

Cisco.com

- **Authorization is the embodiment of the ability to enforce policies on identities**
- **Typically policies are applied using a group methodology—allows for easier manageability**
- **The goal is to take the notion of group management and policies into the network**
- **Basic policy enforcement is the ability to allow or disallow access to the network**

SEC-2005  
8136\_05\_2003\_c1

©2003, Cisco Systems, Inc. All rights reserved.

62

## Dynamic VLAN Assignment

Cisco.com

- Dynamic VLAN assignment based on identity
- Allows VLAN assignment, by group, or individual, at the time of authentication
- VLANs assigned by name—allows for more flexible VLAN management
- Allows VLAN policies to be applied to groups of users (i.e., VLAN QoS, VLAN ACLs, etc.)


SEC-2005  
8136\_05\_2003\_c1

©2003, Cisco Systems, Inc. All rights reserved.

63

## Example Solution “A”—Access Control and User Policy Enforcement

Cisco.com



SEC-2005  
8136\_05\_2003\_c1

©2003, Cisco Systems, Inc. All rights reserved.

64

## Commonly Asked Questions

## Most Commonly Asked Questions

- **Does the Catalyst XXX support EAP-XXX?**  
The switches are transparent to the EAP method used. The switch typically does not need to "support" an EAP method.
- **Does Catalyst Cisco IOS for 6K/4K support feature XXX?**  
If the feature is any newer than 6 months old... probably not. Cisco IOS is on a different (read: much slower) development cycle than CatOS.
- **Does 2950/3550 Cisco IOS support feature XXX?**  
DSBU IOS is on a separate development cycle from CatOS and 6K/4K Cisco IOS. It's faster than 6K/4K IOS but currently slightly behind CatOS. Most features for DSBU IOS are 3 months behind CatOS. The goal is to get DSBU IOS and CatOS at par
- **Will the Catalyst XXXX XL platform get 802.1x?**  
No. There will be no upgrades or enhancements to the Catalyst XL switches to add 802.1x or any identity features. This is primarily because of a hardware limitation problem. There isn't enough code space to include 802.1x features and fix any potential bugs later on.
- **How does our 802.1x strategy fit with our VoIP solutions?**  
This topic gets its own slide...

## 802.1x and VoIP

Cisco.com

- **Two phases of VoIP and 802.1x support**

**802.1x with VVID**—Unauthenticated Voice VLAN (VVID) access, Authenticated Data VLAN (PVID) access; this leaves voice no better than it is today, but allows 802.1x and VoIP to co-exist at the same time

**802.1x supplicants in IP phones**—Committed for next gen phones (7965) work in progress for existing phones (7960)—not yet committed; phones will act as passthrough for PVID authentication


SEC-2005  
8136\_05\_2003\_c1

©2003, Cisco Systems, Inc. All rights reserved.

67

## In the Context of IP Phones and 802.1x

Cisco.com



SEC-2005  
8136\_05\_2003\_c1

©2003, Cisco Systems, Inc. All rights reserved.

68

## Operating System 802.1x Support?

Cisco.com

- **Windows XP**—now, ships with support
- **Windows 2000**—currently available with SP3 + Hotfix from KB Article 313664
- **Windows NT/98/Me**—limited availability or 3rd party (MeetingHouse)
- **Linux**—open source  
<http://www.open1x.org>
- **Solaris**—3rd party via MeetingHouse Communications <http://www.mtghouse.com>
- **Apple**—coming soon!

SEC-2005  
8136\_05\_2003\_c1

©2003, Cisco Systems, Inc. All rights reserved.

69

## What Platforms Support This?

Cisco.com

- **Catalyst 5500**—basic 802.1x only
- **Catalyst 6000/4000**—all features\*
- **Catalyst 2950/3550**—all features\*
- **Aironet WLAN APs**—all features\*
- **Cisco 800 series**—specialized feature set

\* Features Will Be Limited by Platform Capabilities

SEC-2005  
8136\_05\_2003\_c1


©2003, Cisco Systems, Inc. All rights reserved.

70

# Deployment Example

Creating Value out of All the Pieces

## Example Solution “A”—Access Control and User Policy Enforcement



## Deployment Example Overview

Cisco.com

- **Windows XP clients**
- **CiscoSecure ACS 3.2**
- **Authenticating to Active Directory**
- **Controlling access via switches**
- **Dynamically assigning VLANs based on group membership in AD**
- **Using username and password to authenticate via PEAP/EAP-MSCHAPv2**

SEC-2005  
8136\_05\_2003\_c1

©2003, Cisco Systems, Inc. All rights reserved.

73

## Scenario Dependencies

Cisco.com

- **WinXP clients: require Service Pack 1 installed**
- **Windows 2000 server for ACS 3.2: requires all current service packs and patches**
- **CatOS switches: CatOS 7.5.1+**
- **Cisco IOS switches: Cisco IOS 12.1(EA1)13+**
- **Enterprise PKI (i.e. MS CA) or trusted 3rd party (i.e. Verisign) certificate for ACS**

SEC-2005  
8136\_05\_2003\_c1

©2003, Cisco Systems, Inc. All rights reserved.

74

# Authentication Server Configuration

CiscoSecure ACS for Windows  
CiscoSecure ACS Appliance


## ACS Configuration Adding the Network Access Device

The screenshot displays the 'Network Configuration' page in the CiscoSecure ACS for Windows web interface. It features three main configuration sections: 'AAA Clients', 'AAA Servers', and 'Group Identification Table'. Each section includes input fields for name, IP address, and other parameters, along with 'Add' and 'Delete' buttons. A sidebar on the right provides a navigation menu for various configuration tasks. A note at the bottom of the sidebar explains the page design and provides instructions for adding and managing network device groups.

# ACS Configuration

## Adding the Network Access Device

Cisco.com



SEC-2005  
8136\_05\_2003\_c1


© 2003, Cisco Systems, Inc. All rights reserved.

77

# ACS Configuration

## Server Certificate Setup

Cisco.com




SEC-2005  
8136\_05\_2003\_c1

© 2003, Cisco Systems, Inc. All rights reserved.

78

# ACS Configuration Server Certificate Setup

Cisco.com




SEC-2005  
8136\_05\_2003\_c1

© 2003, Cisco Systems, Inc. All rights reserved.

79

# ACS Configuration Server Certificate Setup—PKCS #7 Certificate Request

Cisco.com



SEC-2005  
8136\_05\_2003\_c1


© 2003, Cisco Systems, Inc. All rights reserved.

80

# ACS Configuration

## Server Certificate Request (MS Certificate Services)

Cisco.com



SEC-2005  
8136\_05\_2003\_c1


©2003, Cisco Systems, Inc. All rights reserved.

81

# ACS Configuration

## Server Certificate Request (MS Certificate Services)

Cisco.com



SEC-2005  
8136\_05\_2003\_c1


©2003, Cisco Systems, Inc. All rights reserved.

82

# ACS Configuration

## Server Certificate Request (MS Certificate Services)

Cisco.com



SEC-2005  
8136\_05\_2003\_c1


© 2003, Cisco Systems, Inc. All rights reserved.

83

# ACS Configuration

## Server Certificate Request (MS Certificate Services)

Cisco.com



SEC-2005  
8136\_05\_2003\_c1


© 2003, Cisco Systems, Inc. All rights reserved.

84

# ACS Configuration

## Server Certificate Request (MS Certificate Services)

Cisco.com



SEC-2005  
8136\_05\_2003\_c1

© 2003, Cisco Systems, Inc. All rights reserved.

85

# ACS Configuration

## Server Certificate Request (MS Certificate Services)

Cisco.com




SEC-2005  
8136\_05\_2003\_c1

© 2003, Cisco Systems, Inc. All rights reserved.

86

# ACS Configuration Server Certificate Installation

Cisco.com



SEC-2005  
8136\_05\_2003\_c1

©2003, Cisco Systems, Inc. All rights reserved.

87

# ACS Configuration Server Certificate Installation

Cisco.com



SEC-2005  
8136\_05\_2003\_c1


©2003, Cisco Systems, Inc. All rights reserved.

88

# ACS Configuration

## Global Authentication Setup—EAP Method Selection

Cisco.com



SEC-2005  
8136\_05\_2003\_c1


© 2003, Cisco Systems, Inc. All rights reserved.

89

# ACS Configuration

## External User Database Configuration

Cisco.com



SEC-2005  
8136\_05\_2003\_c1


© 2003, Cisco Systems, Inc. All rights reserved.

90

# ACS Configuration

## External User Database Configuration

Cisco.com



SEC-2005  
8136\_05\_2003\_c1


© 2003, Cisco Systems, Inc. All rights reserved.

91

# ACS Configuration

## External User Database Configuration

Cisco.com



SEC-2005  
8136\_05\_2003\_c1


© 2003, Cisco Systems, Inc. All rights reserved.

92

# ACS Configuration

## External User Database Configuration

Cisco.com



SEC-2005  
8136\_05\_2003\_c1


© 2003, Cisco Systems, Inc. All rights reserved.

93

# ACS Configuration

## External User Database Group Mapping

Cisco.com



SEC-2005  
8136\_05\_2003\_c1


© 2003, Cisco Systems, Inc. All rights reserved.

94

# ACS Configuration

## External User Database Group Mapping

Cisco.com



SEC-2005  
8136\_05\_2003\_c1


© 2003, Cisco Systems, Inc. All rights reserved.

95

# ACS Configuration

## External User Database Group Mapping

Cisco.com



SEC-2005  
8136\_05\_2003\_c1


© 2003, Cisco Systems, Inc. All rights reserved.

96

# ACS Configuration

## External User Database Group Mapping

Cisco.com



SEC-2005  
8136\_05\_2003\_c1


© 2003, Cisco Systems, Inc. All rights reserved.

97

# ACS Configuration

## External User Database Group Mapping

Cisco.com



SEC-2005  
8136\_05\_2003\_c1


© 2003, Cisco Systems, Inc. All rights reserved.

98

# ACS Configuration

## External User Database Group Mapping

Cisco.com



SEC-2005  
8136\_05\_2003\_c1


© 2003, Cisco Systems, Inc. All rights reserved.

99

# ACS Configuration

## External User Database Group Mapping

Cisco.com



SEC-2005  
8136\_05\_2003\_c1

© 2003, Cisco Systems, Inc. All rights reserved.

100





# Authenticator (Switch) Configuration

Catalyst 6500/4500/4000

Catalyst 2950/3550

## Switch Configuration CatOS Configuration—Global Commands

### # RADIUS configuration

```
set radius server <ip_address> auth-port 1812 primary  
set radius key <key>
```

### # Global 802.1x configuration

```
set dot1x system-auth-control enable  
set dot1x quiet-period 10 (default: 30)  
set dot1x tx-period 10 (default: 30)  
set dot1x supp-timeout 5 (default: 30)  
set dot1x server-timeout 5 (default: 30)  
set dot1x max-req 4 (default: 2)  
set dot1x re-authperiod
```

## Switch Configuration

### CatOS Configuration—Per-Port Commands

Cisco.com

```
# Port Level 802.1x configuration
set port dot1x <mod/port> port-control auto
set port dot1x <mod/port> port-control force-authorized
set port dot1x <mod/port> multiple-host enable/disable
set port dot1x <mod/port> re-authentication enable/disable
```

SEC-2005  
8136\_05\_2003\_c1

©2003, Cisco Systems, Inc. All rights reserved.

107

## Switch Configuration

### IOS Configuration—Global Commands

Cisco.com

```
# RADIUS configuration
radius-server host <ip_address>
radius-server key <key>
aaa new-model
aaa authentication dot1x default group radius
aaa authorization default group radius
aaa authorization config-commands
```

```
# 802.1x Global Commands
dot1x system-auth-control
dot1x max-req
dot1x timeout quiet-period
dot1x timeout tx-period
dot1x timeout re-authperiod
dot1x re-authentication
```

SEC-2005  
8136\_05\_2003\_c1

©2003, Cisco Systems, Inc. All rights reserved.

108

## Switch Configuration

### IOS Configuration—Per-Port Commands


Cisco.com

```
# IOS Per-port configuration
dot1x port-control auto
```

SEC-2005  
8136\_05\_2003\_c1

©2003, Cisco Systems, Inc. All rights reserved.

109



Cisco.com

## Client Supplicant Configuration

### Windows XP SP1

SEC-2005  
8136\_05\_2003\_c1


©2003, Cisco Systems, Inc. All rights reserved.

110

# Supplicant Configuration

## Network Connection Properties

Cisco.com



SEC-2005  
8136\_05\_2003\_c1



©2003, Cisco Systems, Inc. All rights reserved.

111

# Supplicant Configuration

## Network Interface Authentication Properties

Cisco.com



SEC-2005  
8136\_05\_2003\_c1



©2003, Cisco Systems, Inc. All rights reserved.

112

# Supplicant Configuration

## Authentication Method—PEAP Configuration

Cisco.com



SEC-2005  
8136\_05\_2003\_c1


© 2003, Cisco Systems, Inc. All rights reserved.

113

# Supplicant Configuration

## Interface Status—Disconnected State

Cisco.com



SEC-2005  
8136\_05\_2003\_c1


© 2003, Cisco Systems, Inc. All rights reserved.

114

# Supplicant Configuration

## Interface Status—Connected/Authenticating State

Cisco.com



SEC-2005  
8136\_05\_2003\_c1


©2003, Cisco Systems, Inc. All rights reserved.

115

# Supplicant Configuration

## Interface Status—Auth Successful/Connected State

Cisco.com



SEC-2005  
8136\_05\_2003\_c1

©2003, Cisco Systems, Inc. All rights reserved.

116



Cisco.com

# Troubleshooting

SEC-2005  
8136\_05\_2003\_c1

©2003, Cisco Systems, Inc. All rights reserved.

117

## Authentication Server Troubleshooting

Cisco.com

- **Set logging in ACS to full detail**
- **Enable logging of passed authentications (disabled by default)**
- **Logs available in ACS GUI, but additional detailed information is available in logging directories**

SEC-2005  
8136\_05\_2003\_c1


©2003, Cisco Systems, Inc. All rights reserved.

118

# Authentication Server Troubleshooting

## Logging Detail Level Configuration

Cisco.com



SEC-2005  
8136\_05\_2003\_c1


© 2003, Cisco Systems, Inc. All rights reserved.

119

# Authentication Server Troubleshooting

## General Logging Configuration

Cisco.com




SEC-2005  
8136\_05\_2003\_c1

© 2003, Cisco Systems, Inc. All rights reserved.

120

## Authentication Server Troubleshooting Additional Logging File Directories

Cisco.com



SEC-2005  
8136\_05\_2003\_c1

© 2003, Cisco Systems, Inc. All rights reserved.

121

## CatOS Authenticator Troubleshooting

Cisco.com

- **Enable 802.1x tracing on CatOS platforms**  
**'set trace dot1x <level>'**  
**"level" is a detail level value between 0–15**  
**15 will do a full packet dump!**  
**10 is usually good enough for most troubleshooting**  
**Don't forget to disable tracing once you are done!**  
**'set trace all 0'**

SEC-2005  
8136\_05\_2003\_c1

© 2003, Cisco Systems, Inc. All rights reserved.

122

## Cisco IOS Authenticator Troubleshooting

Cisco.com

- Use the debug command like on Cisco IOS routers

`'debug dot1x <option>'`

“option” can be:

**all:** All 802.1x events

**authsm:** The authenticator FSM

**backend:** AAA Backend Communications

**besm:** backend FSM events

**core:** core 802.1x subsystem

**reauthsm:** re-authentication FSM

SEC-2005  
8136\_05\_2003\_c1

©2003, Cisco Systems, Inc. All rights reserved.

123

## Windows XP/Windows 2000 Troubleshooting

Cisco.com

- Enable tracing and logging in the supplicant

`'netsh ras set tr * enable'`

**Enables supplicant tracing and logging**

**Creates logging debug files in**

`'%systemRoot%/tracing'`

**Disable it with the command 'netsh ras set tr \* disable'**


SEC-2005  
8136\_05\_2003\_c1

©2003, Cisco Systems, Inc. All rights reserved.

124

# Windows Troubleshooting— Tracing Directory

Cisco.com




SEC-2005  
8136\_05\_2003\_c1

©2003, Cisco Systems, Inc. All rights reserved.

125

# Windows Troubleshooting— Tracing Files

Cisco.com



SEC-2005  
8136\_05\_2003\_c1

©2003, Cisco Systems, Inc. All rights reserved.

126

## Examining the EAPOL Log

Cisco.com

```
[1496] 16:30:35: EIMediaEventsHandler entered
[1496] 16:30:35: EIMediaEventsHandler: Calling EIMediaSenseCallback
[1496] 16:30:35: EIMediaSenseCallback: Entered
[1496] 16:30:35: EIMediaSenseCallbackWorker: For interface (Intel(R) 82559 Fast
Ethernet LAN on Motherboard), GUID ({0D7295D2-F5F1-4A62-A494-
AA3D4239CF49}), length of block = 94
[1496] 16:30:35: EIMediaSenseCallbackWorker: Callback for sense connect
[1496] 16:30:36: EIoCompletionRoutine called, 60 bytes xferred
[1496] 16:30:36: EIoReadCompletionRoutine entered, 60 bytes recvd
[1496] 16:30:36: ProcessReceivedPacket entered, length = 60
[1496] 16:30:36: ProcessReceivedPacket: EAP_Packet
[1496] 16:30:36: ProcessReceivedPacket: EAPOLSTATE_CONNECTING
[1496] 16:30:36: TIMER: Restart PCB           Time: 2097148
[1496] 16:30:36: FSMAcquired entered for port Intel(R) 82559 Fast Ethernet LAN on
Motherboard - Packet Scheduler Miniport
[1496] 16:30:36: TIMER: Restart PCB           Time: 30
```

SEC-2005  
8136\_05\_2003\_c1

©2003, Cisco Systems, Inc. All rights reserved.

127

## Examining the EAPOL Log

Cisco.com

```
[1496] 16:30:36: FSMAcquired entered for port Intel(R) 82559 Fast Ethernet LAN on
Motherboard - Packet Scheduler Miniport
[1496] 16:30:36: TIMER: Restart PCB           Time: 30
[1496] 16:30:36: EIEapEnd entered
[1496] 16:30:36: EIEapBegin entered
[1496] 16:30:36: EIEapBegin done
[1496] 16:30:36: EIEapWork: EapolPkt created at 00137008
[1496] 16:30:36: EIEapMakeMessage entered
[1496] 16:30:36: EIParseIdentityString: Packet length 5 less than minimum 5
[1496] 16:30:36: EIGetIdentity: Userlogged, Prev !Machine auth
[1496] 16:30:36: EIGetIdentity: Userlogged, <Maxauth, Prev !Machine auth: !MD5
[1496] 16:30:36: EIGetUserIdentity entered
[1496] 16:30:36: EIGetEapUserInfo: Get value succeeded
[1496] 16:30:36: EIGetEapUserInfo: Get value succeeded
[1496] 16:30:36: EIGetUserIdentityOptimized: Got identity =
ESELABS\Administrator
[1496] 16:30:36: EIGetUserIdentity: EIGetUserIdentityOptimized got identity without
user module intervention
```

SEC-2005  
8136\_05\_2003\_c1

©2003, Cisco Systems, Inc. All rights reserved.

128

## Examining the EAPOL Log

Cisco.com

```
[1496] 16:30:36: ElGetUserIdentity completed with error 0
[1496] 16:30:36: ElGetIdentity: Userlogged, <Maxauth, Prev !Machine auth: No
Error: User Auth fine
[1496] 16:30:36: Identity sent out = ESELABS\Administrator
[1496] 16:30:36: ElWriteToPort entered: Pkt Length = 32
[1496] 16:30:36: ElWriteToPort: pPCB = 0009FE78, RefCnt = 3
[1496] 16:30:36: ElWriteToInterface entered
[1496] 16:30:36: ElWriteToInterface completed, RetCode = 0
[1496] 16:30:36: Setting state ACQUIRED for port Intel(R) 82559 Fast Ethernet LAN
on Motherboard - Packet Scheduler Miniport
[1496] 16:30:36: FSMACquired completed for port Intel(R) 82559 Fast Ethernet LAN
on Motherboard - Packet Scheduler Miniport
[1496] 16:30:36: ProcessReceivedPacket: Reposting buffer on port {0D7295D2-
F5F1-4A62-A494-AA3D4239CF49}
[1496] 16:30:36: ElReadFromPort entered
[1496] 16:30:36: ElReadFromPort: pPCB = 0009FE78, RefCnt = 4
```

SEC-2005  
8136\_05\_2003\_c1

©2003, Cisco Systems, Inc. All rights reserved.

129

## Examining the EAPOL Log

Cisco.com

```
[1496] 16:30:37: ProcessReceivedPacket entered, length = 1030
[1496] 16:30:37: ProcessReceivedPacket: EAP_Packet
[1496] 16:30:37: ProcessReceivedPacket: EAPOLSTATE_AUTHENTICATING
[1496] 16:30:37: TIMER: Restart PCB Time: 2097148
[1496] 16:30:37: FSMAuthenticating entered for port Intel(R) 82559 Fast Ethernet LAN
on Motherboard - Packet Scheduler Miniport
[1496] 16:30:37: TIMER: Restart PCB Time: 30
[1496] 16:30:37: ElEapWork: EapolPkt created at 00150308
[1496] 16:30:37: ElEapMakeMessage entered
[1496] 16:30:37: ElMakeSupplicantMessage entered
[1496] 16:30:37: EAPSTATE_Working
[1496] 16:30:37: ElEapDIIWork called for EAP Type 25
[1496] 16:30:37: EAP DII returned Action=EAPACTION_Send
[1496] 16:30:37: ElEapDIIWork finished for EAP Type 25 with error 0
[1496] 16:30:37: ElWriteToPort entered: Pkt Length = 12
[1496] 16:30:37: ElWriteToPort: pPCB = 0009FE78, RefCnt = 3
[1496] 16:30:37: ElWriteToInterface entered
[1496] 16:30:37: ElWriteToInterface completed, RetCode = 0
```

SEC-2005  
8136\_05\_2003\_c1

©2003, Cisco Systems, Inc. All rights reserved.

130

## Examining the EAPOL Log

Cisco.com

```
[1496] 16:30:39: ConnectionStatusChanged completed
[1496] 16:30:39: FSMAuthenticating completed for port Intel(R) 82559 Fast Ethernet
LAN on Motherboard - Packet Scheduler Miniport
[1496] 16:30:39: TIMER: Restart PCB          Time: 2097148
[1496] 16:30:39: EIPProcessEapSuccess: Got EAPCODE_Success
[1496] 16:30:39: EIEapEnd entered
[1496] 16:30:39: EIEapDIIEnd called for EAP Index 1
[1496] 16:30:39: EIPProcessEapSuccess: Authentication successful
[1496] 16:30:39: FSMAuthenticated entered for port Intel(R) 82559 Fast Ethernet LAN
on Motherboard - Packet Scheduler Miniport
[1496] 16:30:39: EIEapEnd entered
[1496] 16:30:39: FSMAuthenticated: Queued EIIPPnPWorker
[1496] 16:30:39: Setting state AUTHENTICATED for port Intel(R) 82559 Fast Ethernet
LAN on Motherboard - Packet Scheduler Miniport
[1496] 16:30:39: FSMAuthenticated completed for port Intel(R) 82559 Fast Ethernet
LAN on Motherboard - Packet Scheduler Miniport
```

SEC-2005  
8136\_05\_2003\_c1

©2003, Cisco Systems, Inc. All rights reserved.

131

## Examining the EAPOL Log

Cisco.com

```
[1496] 16:30:39: EIZeroConfigNotify: Handle=(0), failcount=(0),
lastauththtype=(0)
[1496] 16:30:39: EIZeroConfigNotify: RpcCmdInterface failed with error 2
[1496] 16:30:39: EIPProcessEapSuccess: EIZeroConfigNotify failed with
error 2
[1496] 16:30:39: EIPProcessEapSuccess: Called EIZeroConfigNotify with
type=(5)
[1496] 16:30:39: WZCNetmanConnectionStatusChanged: Entered
[1496] 16:30:39: QueueEvent: CoCreateInstance succeeded
[1496] 16:30:39: ConnectionStatusChanged completed
[1496] 16:30:39: ProcessReceivedPacket: Reposting buffer on port
{0D7295D2-F5F1-4A62-A494-AA3D4239CF49}
[1496] 16:30:39: EIReadFromPort entered
[1496] 16:30:39: EIReadFromPort: pPCB = 0009FE78, RefCnt = 3
[1496] 16:30:39: ProcessReceivedPacket: pPCB= 0009FE78, RefCnt = 3
[1496] 16:30:39: ProcessReceivedPacket exit
[1940] 16:30:39: EIIPPnPWorker: DHCPHandlePnPEvent successful
[1940] 16:30:39: Ip6RenewInterface: CreateFileW failed with error 2
[1940] 16:30:39: EIIPPnPWorker: Ip6RenewInterface returned error 2
```

SEC-2005  
8136\_05\_2003\_c1

©2003, Cisco Systems, Inc. All rights reserved.

132

## Examining the RASTLS Log

Cisco.com

```
[1496] 16:30:36:119: PeapReadConnectionData
[1496] 16:30:36:119: PeapReadUserData
[1496] 16:30:36:119: RasEapGetInfo
[1496] 16:30:37:301: EapPeapBegin
[1496] 16:30:37:311: PeapReadConnectionData
[1496] 16:30:37:311: PeapReadUserData
[1496] 16:30:37:311:
[1496] 16:30:37:311: EapTlsBegin(ESELABSAdministrator)
[1496] 16:30:37:311: State change to Initial
[1496] 16:30:37:311: EapTlsBegin: Detected 8021X authentication
[1496] 16:30:37:311: EapTlsBegin: Detected PEAP authentication
[1496] 16:30:37:311: MaxTLSMessageLength is now 16384
[1496] 16:30:37:311: EapPeapBegin done
[1496] 16:30:37:311: EapPeapMakeMessage
[1496] 16:30:37:311: EapPeapCMakeMessage
[1496] 16:30:37:311: PEAP:PEAP_STATE_INITIAL
[1496] 16:30:37:311: EapTlsCMakeMessage
[1496] 16:30:37:311: EapTlsReset
```

SEC-2005  
8136\_05\_2003\_c1

©2003, Cisco Systems, Inc. All rights reserved.

133

## Examining the RASTLS log

Cisco.com

```
[1496] 16:30:37:311: No Cert Store. Guest Access requested
[1496] 16:30:37:311: No Cert Name. Guest access requested
[1496] 16:30:37:311: Will validate server cert
[1496] 16:30:37:311: MakeReplyMessage
[1496] 16:30:37:311: SecurityContextFunction
[1496] 16:30:37:311: InitializeSecurityContext returned 0x90312
[1496] 16:30:37:311: State change to SentHello
[1496] 16:30:37:311: BuildPacket
[1496] 16:30:37:311: << Sending Response (Code: 2) packet: Id: 2, Length:
80, Type: 13, TLS blob length: 70. Flags: L
[1496] 16:30:37:311: EapPeapCMakeMessage done
[1496] 16:30:37:311: EapPeapMakeMessage done
[1496] 16:30:37:331: EapPeapMakeMessage
[1496] 16:30:37:331: EapPeapCMakeMessage
```

SEC-2005  
8136\_05\_2003\_c1

©2003, Cisco Systems, Inc. All rights reserved.

134

# What's Next?

## The Future Directions of Identity-Based Networking

## Moving Forward—Work in Progress

- **Enhanced policy enforcement for better identity-based networking**
- **Increased integration into directory services**
- **Increased device support for identity networking**
- **Tighter integration into other Cisco solution sets**

## Recommended Reading

Cisco.com

### Network Security Principles and Practices


ISBN: 1587050250

### CCIE Security Exam Certification Guide

ISBN: 1587200651

### CCIE Practical Studies: Security

ISBN: 1587051109



Available on-site at the Cisco Company Store

SEC-2005  
8136\_05\_2003\_c1

©2003, Cisco Systems, Inc. All rights reserved.

137

## Recommended Reading

Cisco.com

### Managing Cisco Network Security

ISBN: 1578701031


### Cisco Secure Internet Security Solutions

ISBN: 1587050161

### Designing Network Security, Second Ed.

ISBN: 1587051176

Available in Oct 2003



Available on-site at the Cisco Company Store

SEC-2005  
8136\_05\_2003\_c1

©2003, Cisco Systems, Inc. All rights reserved.

138

# NETWORKERS 2003

THE POWER TO TRANSFORM BUSINESS. **now.**

**Please Complete Your  
Evaluation Form**

**Session SEC-2005**



SEC-2005  
8136\_05\_2003\_c1

©2003, Cisco Systems, Inc. All rights reserved.

139



SEC-2005  
8136\_05\_2003\_c1

©2003, Cisco Systems, Inc. All rights reserved.

140